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The John Dewey Memorial Lecture
Education, Intelligence, and
Character in Judges
The Honorable John T. Noonan, Jr.*
In memory of a philosopher who exercised such a strong
influence on American life in the first half of this century, I ad-
dress a topic that reflects themes dear to John Dewey's heart.
The key role of creative intelligence, the encompassing power
of education, and the importance of character are familiar to
any student of Dewey. Above all in Dewey there is concern
that knowledge be translated into action-into action solving
the problems of society. Judges are precisely such solvers of
problems, precisely such translators of knowledge into action.
It is no accident that John Dewey saluted Justice Holmes's
work as "a pattern of the liberal mind in operation."1
I propose to approach this subject in Deweyite (or Aristote-
lian) fashion, empirically, but not in the manner of much social
science research that seeks the typical or average. I am inter-
ested in what makes the best. I plan to focus my data on a sin-
gle question: What are the constituents of judicial greatness?
To put it another way: What makes a judge great?
I hold that an answer to this question is more instructive
than finding out the place of education, intelligence, and char-
acter in an average judge. I believe
Lives of great men all remind us
We can make our lives sublime.2
To answer my question I shall look at the lives of seven famous
men who were judges-six who were great, one who was an im-
poster. A philosophical premise underlies this way of
proceeding.
The Premise. Interpretation is still the question of the day.
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
1. J. DEWEY, Justice Holmes and the Liberal Mind, in 3 THE LATER
WoRKs, 1925-1953, at 178 (J. Boydston ed. 1984).
2. H.W. LONGFELLOW, A PsALM OF LIFE (1838).
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How you interpret the Constitution is the issue that divides jus-
tices and political camps and scholars. How you interpret the
Bible was once and still is a crux in religious controversy. How
you interpret any text has been made a puzzle not only for pro-
fessional epistemologists but for critics and teachers of litera-
ture. It has become a question whether you can interpret any
text without dissolving what you interpret into your own re-
statement that is no longer an interpretation but a new text.
Controversy has created a hermeneutic morass.3
Texts, it is evident to anyone who has confronted them, do
not speak for themselves. A will that is supposed to speak for
the dead is found on close examination by lawyers for the liv-
ing to have more than one meaning. Statutes that represent
the intentions of lawmakers do not exist without uncertainties
in their sense. The Constitution itself is full of phrases--"due
process of law" is the best known-patient of exegesis in differ-
ent and sometimes unexpectedly wayward ways.
Notations on pieces of paper, texts do not resist manipula-
tion by those minded to manipulate them. Gross glosses can be
and are written on them. A modern director can turn the di-
vine duke of Measure for Measure into a sadistic tyrant.4 A
Supreme Court can turn the protection of privacy into an es-
cape hatch for criminals.5 Mute and uncomplaining, a text can-
not retort, "I'm misunderstood."
Texts are inert. Persons are resistant. If a person is speak-
ing to you and is misunderstood, no hermeneutic hiatus devel-
ops. No infinite interpretive regress is permitted when living
persons are in dialogue. Correction is instantaneous. "You
missed my meaning. You haven't got the point. You didn't
hear what I said." The person's own interpretation of his
meaning is definitive-definitive at least if the persons have re-
spect and affection for each other. Quarrelling, one may seek
to impose his meaning on another's speech. In ordinary conver-
sation the speaker defines the sense he intended.
In respect and affection for persons lies the path out of the
hermeneutic morass. Texts are after all only the memorial of a
person's thoughts. The person is not there to offer instantane-
3. See, e.g., Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law
and Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 551 (1982); Fish, Wrong Again, 62 TEx. L.
REV. 299 (1983).
4. Such, I am informed by Professor Hugh Richmond, was the interpre-
tation of the play at Ashland, Oregon, in the early 1980s.
5. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08 (1984).
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ous correction. Absent, he or she can be disregarded as brutally
as a text. But behind the words the person can be glimpsed,
seen, appreciated. The person did have a meaning. Whoever
loves him or her will not try to replace that meaning with
someone else's.
In this perspective, it does not matter whether the author
of a text is alive or dead. The text can be that of a contract
written yesterday or that of a will written twenty years ago for
a testator now deceased. The effort respectful of persons will
attempt to determine what the person meant. The task is simi-
lar if more difficult in the case of legislation or the Constitu-
tion. The difficulty is caused not so much by the antiquity of a
document as by the multiplicity of authors. Many persons have
pooled their thoughts. A single legislative or constitutional text
has resulted. Still, concrete persons speak through the text.6
Humanistic hermeneutics does not stop at the text as an ar-
tifact free to be pushed or pulled, shaped or misshaped as suits
the interpreter. Conscious that every word is the work of a fel-
low human being, the humanistic interpreter seeks to respond
to that person or persons. The text is not the interpreter's
thing. The text is the trail left by the other.
Much can be made of the difficulty of understanding those
who spoke at another period, who were unfamiliar with our in-
ventions, our practices, our problems. The difficulty is parallel
to understanding those who speak to us as contemporaries out
of a different culture. Anthropologists, insisting on the differ-
ence, still communicate with that culture. Historians, insisting
on the uniqueness of the past, do not despair of understanding
it. Cultural chasms can be crossed if we choose.
We are indeed coming closer to past cultures. Our tech-
niques have been refined, our empathy enlarged. To take one
illustration, it was the contention of nineteenth and twentieth
century scholarship that the ancients-Hebrews, Greeks, Sax-
ons-did not distinguish between intentional, negligent, and ac-
cidental killing. Today we see, thanks in particular to the work
of David Daube, that the ancient world possessed as well as we
the concepts of the intentional, the accidental, and the negli-
gent.7 The fundamental elements determining human respon-
sibility have been constant for over 3,000 years. Across the
chasm, out of the morass, we encounter the common humanity
6. See J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 164-65 (1976).
7. D. DAUBE, ANcIENT JEwISH LAW 49-69 (1981); D. DAUBE, ROMAN LAW:
LINGuIsTIc, SOCIAL, AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS 157-75 (1969).
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of human beings. With empathy, with tact, with wisdom, we
can share their meanings. My philosophical premise is that in-
terpretation is possible if persons, not texts, are what we seek
to understand.
The Experiment. If my premise is accepted, we have, in
studying or practicing or declaring law, reason to take more
than casual notice of the persons who speak to us in precedents.
Judges are not fungible. It is my habit, and I suspect that of
many of my colleagues, to take into account the author of each
opinion on which I rely. We cannot know all the authors. But
of all the authors of opinions those with the most amount of in-
terest for us are the great judges.
Judges to whom common agreement accords the denomi-
nation "great" are the equivalent in the legal world of those in
the religious world who are acknowledged as saints by popular
acclamation. Great judges speak more clearly than the act of
any legislature because they are single individuals. They speak
more distinctly than lesser judges because we know more about
the great, because they have more to teach, and because they
themselves more successfully integrated their lives with their
judging. They speak to us with force and power. Perceptible as
persons, they cross the chasm of cultures. They make us con-
front the persons of the past.
For experimental purposes here, to answer the question,
What makes a judge great?, I select seven famous judges:
Bracton, Coke, Bacon, Marshall, Holmes, Cardozo, and Bran-
deis. From Bracton to Brandeis they span seven hundred years
of Anglo-American law. They wrote in a feudal society, in a
centralized monarchy, in an infant republic, in a mature democ-
racy. Six were truly great judges; one, as I have indicated, was
a pretender. I propose to review the part their education, their
intelligence, and their character played in making them great.
Education. To begin with the first of the seven, Bracton, I
must confess that on inspection he turns out to be two men.
"Bracton" is the traditional author of De legibus et consue-
tudinibus Angliae, the greatest treatise on English law before
Blackstone. The true author of this work, modern scholarship
suggests, was William of Ralegh,8 Chief Justice of England
under King Henry III. Ralegh wrote the work. Henri de
8. See Thorne, Translator's Introduction to 3 BRACTON ON THE LAWS
AND CusToMs OF ENGLAND (BRACTON DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS AN-
GLIAE) xxxvi (S. Thorne ed. 1977) (Ralegh "the prime mover"); cf Maitland,
Introduction to 1 BRACToN's NOTE BOOK 14 (F. Maitland ed. 1887) (discussing
1122 [Vol. 71:1119
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Bracton, his law clerk, edited it and neatly reversed the ordi-
nary process by which the judge is credited with his clerk's pro-
ductions. The clerk became the acknowledged author. Taking
Ralegh as the truly significant figure, I find that his formal ed-
ucation was in the elements of canon law and Roman law, prob-
ably at Exeter; the more important part of his professional
education came by serving at least a decade, from 1218 to 1229,
as law clerk to another royal justice, Martin Pateshull.9
Some formal schooling but mostly on-the-job training char-
acterized Ralegh's education. The same is true of Coke, Bacon,
and Marshall. Coke and Bacon were both students at the Inns
of Court, the practical professional training ground of English
barristers. Bacon attended Trinity College, Cambridge, from
the age of thirteen to sixteen, leaving without a degree,10 and at
the age of eighteen began to study law at Gray's Inn, where ed-
ucation was "by personal emulation."11 Without benefit of for-
mal education, John Marshall went to law school at the College
of William and Mary, where George Wythe was the sole profes-
sor of law. His attendance was at the most for six weeks.12 He
began with the study of the "A"s--"Abatement" and "Abut-
ters"-and in his short stay actually reached L for "Legacies,"
admittedly with "Juries" left blank.13 Marshall received his
completed education in law only by practice as a solo practi-
tioner in Richmond.
Holmes actually graduated from college and then attended
law school. The Harvard Law School of his day, with its three
professors of law, could cover only a fraction of a modern cur-
riculum, and Holmes himself dropped out after not much over
a year of study.14 Brandeis attended the same school, slightly
enlarged, a generation later. A graduate of a German gymna-
sium, he skipped college and completed his formal legal educa-
tion under Langdell in the then standard two years.15 He was
ready to graduate at the age of twenty.16 Cardozo was a gradu-
ate of Columbia College and left Columbia Law School after
"the William Raleigh whose judgments Bracton has made immortal" and not-
ing that "Bracton may have been his pupil").
9. See Maitland, supra note 8, at 5, 60.
10. C. BOWEN, FRANcIS BACON 33-37 (1963).
11. F. COWPER, A PROSPEcT OF GRAY'S INN 25 (2d rev. ed. 1985).
12. 1 A. BEVERiDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 154 (1916).
13. I& at 174-76.
14. M. HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE SHAPING YEARS-
1841-1870, at 184, 189, 204 (1957).
15. A.T. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 33-34 (1946).
16. 1& at 47.
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two years' attendance.' 7
It is perhaps painfully apparent that an enriched academic
curriculum, a wide variety of courses, and a prolonged immer-
sion in academic legal culture were not necessary to these
judges attaining greatness. Marshall's few weeks under Wythe
seem to have stood him in as good stead as Brandeis's two years
in a more sophisticated school. To do very well at law, one
might generalize from these cases, one must be socialized in the
basic concepts and the professional ethics. After that, a power-
ful mind will develop itself by professional endeavors.
This conclusion, it might be added, would not have sur-
prised John Dewey, whose basic creed was that "all education
proceeds by the participation of the individual in the social con-
sciousness of the race," with the added caveat that formal edu-
cation "cannot safely depart from this general process."' 8 All
seven judges, as their writings show, were soaked in the social
consciousness of their periods and the legal profession of their
day. Their education was achieved by their intelligent partici-
pation in this consciousness. Their academic training merely
provided them with a few tools. Their true education preceded
and accompanied their formal training and continued after that
training was completed.
Intelligence. As their writings demonstrate, all seven
judges were highly intelligent. Their intelligence was not of
the theoretical order of a Spinoza or a Kant. All had an inter-
est in philosophy; none found its abstractness entirely conge-
nial. Even Bacon, who had the strongest philosophical
aspirations, had too concrete a mind to be entirely at home in
the austere domain of metaphysics or epistemology.
All seven were good, even excellent writers, acutely con-
scious of style. Ralegh's alliterations, assonance, and figures of
speech, for example, give charm to his book; Holmes's succinct
prose is deliberately compressed to make an impact. Their tal-
ent of expression has been essential to their greatness. None,
however, was a literary genius. Their ambitions were not pri-
marily aesthetic.
Their intelligence was manifested in their sense of style
and in retentive memories, keen perceptions, the ability to
analogize, to make distinctions, to marshal data, to grasp rela-
17. Kaufman, Benjamin Cardozo, in 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 2288 (L. Friedman & F. Israel ed. 1969).
18. Dewey, My Pedogogic Creed, reprinted in TEACHERS MANUALS 3
(1897).
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tionships, and to bring fact and theory together. In short, their
intelligence as manifested was that peculiarly appropriate to
the legal profession.
In any society, in any role, their intelligence would have
fitted them for positions of prominence. Put to service in the
law and honed by practice, their intelligence became adept at a
lawyer's tasks. Operating within bounds set by society, their in-
telligence was such that they were not unaware that beyond
those bounds lay other realms and mysteries. "Once turn into
the fields and you will hardly stir a step ... without finding
yourself face to face with queries that are ultimate," Cardozo
wrote apropos of Holmes.19
Character. Exceptional intelligence, informal education
achieved through that intelligence, but the most important fac-
tor has yet to be taken into account--character. The assess-
ment of character, we have been judicially informed, is a
parlous enterprise.20 For statutory purposes-admission to the
bar, for example, or admission to the country-a single bad act
is held to destroy good character while an absence of evidence
of evildoing suffices to establish good character.2 1
I shall not employ so arbitrary a standard here, and I enter
with trepidation on the work of assessment, believing that
there is only one true Judge, and that Judge one who judges
judges postmortem. Consider those virtues that Saint Paul
treated as a trinity: faith, hope, and charity.2 2 As to faith,
Ralegh was a Catholic priest; he died the Bishop of
Winchester.23 Coke was a devout defender of the Anglican es-
tablishment;24 Bacon was a worshipper in the same church. 5
Marshall was an Arminian, that is, a Christian who did not ac-
cept the full divinity of Christ.26 The moderns are not conve-
niently classified by church membership. Holmes was a
declared agnostic.2 7 He was also capable of writing that the
master of law would "catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of
its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law. ' 28 The
19. Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 HARV. L. REv. 682, 684-85 (1931).
20. United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233, 1236 (2d Cir. 1974), cert de-
nied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975).
21. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 40-41 (1961).
22. 1 Corinthians 13:13.
23. Maitland, supra note 8, at 47.
24. See C. BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE 264 (1956).
25. See C. BOWEN, FRANcIs BACON 1 (1963).
26. See 4 A. BEvERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 69-71 (1919).
27. See M. HOWE, supra note 14, at 105, 239.
28. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 478 (1897).
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ghost of God underlies this paean to purposeful order. The case
is analogous with Cardozo and Brandeis, far as they were from
traditional Judaism. Brandeis was brought up by parents who
were culturally, not religiously, Jewish; he never attended syn-
agogue.29 Espousing no religion, he acted with a sense that
facts mattered, that ideas mattered, that people mattered.30 His
sense of purpose was scarcely reconcilable with a universe of
chance. Cardozo, disavowing orthodoxy, expressed his belief
through reflection on Albert Noyes's lines:3 '
You and I
Have watched too many constant stars to
dream
That heaven or earth, the destinies of men
Or nations, are the sport of chance.
32
I venture the hypothesis-it is nothing more-that for each of
the seven, faith in the ordered nature of the universe gave
them the confidence necessary to do their own work of order-
ing a corner of the cosmos.
Such confidence was a species of hope beyond the hope
that orthodox believers may derive from their religious faith.
If the whole business of judging is not to seem sisyphean, one
has to have the hope that humanity is helped by what one does.
One has to hope that one's words do not disappear in an abyss
filled with paper. One has to hope for a response. Holmes in
words eschewed such hope, although he could write, "I say to
myself man also may have cosmic destinies beyond his ken.1
33
In Holmes's famous words in Abrams3 4 on the experiment our
Constitution is making,35 there is expressed a confidence in the
29. A.T. MASON, supra note 15, at 441.
30. See id, at 640-44.
31. See CARDOZO, Values: Commencement Address, in SELECTED WRIT-
INGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOzO 4 (M. Hall ed. 1947).
32. A. NOYES, TYCHO BRAHE, reprinted in A. NOYES, THE TORCH-BEAR-
ERS 91 (1922).
33. HOLMES-SHEEHAN CORRESPONDENCE 59 (D. Burton ed. 1976) (letter of
Jan. 31, 1913).
34. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
35. Holmes believed that
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foun-
dations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,
and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can
be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It
is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.
Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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power of ideas-a confidence meaningless unless there is expec-
tation of a response to ideas. John Dewey acutely diagnosed
the Abrams dissent as expressing hope.36 A similar hope ani-
mates Cardozo on liberty of thought 37 and the unflagging
pedagogy of Brandeis's opinions. 38
Charity, in the American sense of giving abundantly to the
needy, was most abundantly demonstrated by Brandeis. In his
lifetime he gave over $1,496,000 to persons or causes. 39 Generos-
ity of this sort is a valid sign of charity in the basic sense of love
of neighbor. Holmes is a more difficult case. On occasion he
was profoundly selfish.40 But who can doubt his kindness when
he makes a friend of a young Chinese correspondent John Wu
or when he writes his friend, the Irish priest, Patrick Sheehan,
"I think of you a great deal and am always hoping that you may
not be suffering. ' '4 '
Coke was a curmudgeon. His treatment of his wife and
daughter Frances marks him as a sexist by modern standards
and a domestic tyrant by earlier ones.42 But must not his char-
ity, that is, his love of neighbor, be also measured by his Re-
ports, those eleven volumes of learned struggles to apply the
law? Is not a judge's unselfish, scarcely remunerated labor the
best evidence of charity? Without a strong desire to be of ser-
vice, would vanity alone account for the care Coke and the
others lavished on their cases? I abstain, then, from any final
judgment on the degree of our seven's faith, hope, and charity.
I suggest but do not prove that without these basic virtues their
work would have withered.
With more confidence I turn to the four cardinal virtues
recognized by Aristotle's Ethics: justice, temperance, prudence,
and fortitude. I begin with justice. Aristotle in the Ethics said
that the ideal judge, in a manner of speaking, is justice personi-
36. J. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 177.
37. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (discussing the
fundamental principles of liberty which lie at the heart of our civil society).
38. See, e.g., Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541, 578-80 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the broad right of Americans to establish and preserve
those social and economic institutions that they deem desirable and concluding
that "[t]o that extent, the citizens of each State are still masters of their
destiny").
39. A.T. MASON, supra note 15, at 692.
40. See, e.g., M. HowE, JusTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING
YEARS-1870-1882, at 265-68 (1963) (the view of James Bradley Thayer).
41. HOLMES-SHEEHAN CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 33, at 60 (letter of
Feb. 5, 1913).
42. A. FRASER, THE WEAKER VESSEL 12-18 (1984).
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fied.43 "Justice and justice alone shall you pursue" was God's
message to Israel when instituting the judges of Israel.44 A
judge without justice is no judge at all.
One of our seven must now be unmasked as a pretender,
as, in fact, an unjust judge. Francis Bacon, Lord Chancellor of
England under James I, was a taker of bribes. One of the
brightest and wittiest men in England in a bright and witty age,
a brilliant essayist, a pioneer and patron of science, Bacon pos-
sessed extraordinary intellectual abilities that did not prevent
him from being a corrupt chancellor. His fault lay not in a sin-
gle slip, a solitary temptation to which he yielded; it consisted
in a robust course of bribe taking pursued in office, with law-
yers employed as go-betweens and his own staff as bagmen,
making Chancery a money-making ring so that his take at least
tripled his lawful income, already high, to make it one of the
highest in the kingdom.45
When caught, Bacon was overwhelmed by a mountain of
testimony as to his acts. His defenses were several. Others did
the same. He gave "little regard" to the bribe in one case.46 In
five other cases, he took from both sides.47 These futile excuses
were unavailing in his trial before the House of Lords48 and are
unavailing now. Criminals always have a custom to appeal to;
custom is no defense to crime. A judge who takes from both
sides is merely a judge who does not stay bought. A judge who
pays little regard to a bribe is guilty of deceit as well as of infi-
delity to his office. Bacon lacked justice. Lacking justice, he
had already ceased to be any kind of judge. His ultimate pun-
ishment fitted the crime; he was declared incapable of holding
office.49 His essays are still read in schools. Scientists still sing
his praise. As an intellectual he commands respect. Among
lawyers, his name is, as he himself expressed it,
All as the chaff, which to and fro
Is toss'd at mercy of the wind.
50
Removing one from our list of seven, I find each of the
43. ARISTOTLE, Ethics, in 9 THE WORKS OF ARTISTOTLE, bk. 5, ch. 4 (W.D.
Ross trans. 1925).
44. Deuteronomy 16:20.
45. J. NOONAN, BRIBES 360 (1984).
46. 1i at 357.
47. I&
48. Id at 360.
49. Id
50. F. BACON, The Translation of the First Psalm, in 7 WORKS OF FRANCIS
BACON 277 (J. Spedding new ed. 1872) (translated when he was sick in 1624).
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others did, to the extent of his powers, personify justice in his
time. Justice and justice alone was what each sought.
As for temperance, understood narrowly as moderation in
bodily pleasure, none were excessive eaters or drinkers. As to
sex, Ralegh and Cardozo were celibates, the other four married
men. Holmes's attraction, past the age of sixty, to Lady
Castletown is apparent in his letters to her;51 more than pla-
tonic love is arguably suggested. If temperance is taken in a
broader sense as moderation in all things, Marshall, Cardozo,
and Brandeis are especially notable for their simple styles of
life.5 2 Coke was a man who wanted to be rich and became rich
by marrying a rich widow.5 3 Ralegh litigated six years to sus-
tain his right to the richest see in England.m In short, the tem-
perance of our six is not as conspicuous as their justice. Yet no
intemperate act or desire is known to have deflected their devo-
tion to justice in cases they judged.
Prudence, a virtue reduced in bourgeois parlance to calcu-
lation, is classically understood as a sense of the means neces-
sary to achieve an end. At the heart of prudence is a sense of
proportion. The means vary with the end in view. The prudent
person strikes the right proportion. So Ralegh's great sprawl-
ing treatise on the laws and customs of England was propor-
tionate to his end of instructing "the lesser judges"5 5 of
England in the law. Coke's commentary on Littleton56 was
similarly proportionate to the task of educating seventeenth-
century Englishmen in the common law of property. Mar-
shall's sweeping declarations on fundamental power relations5 7
were proportionate to the jurisprudential challenges at the be-
ginning of our judicial system. Holmes's pithy analyses58 were
usually, if not always, proportionate to his presentation of the
51. See Monahan, The Love Letters of Justice Holmes, BOSTON GLOBE
MAG., Mar. 24, 1985, at 15.
52. See 4 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 26, at 61-63; Kaufman, supra note 17,
at 2287-88; A.T. MASON, supra note 15, at 77.
53. C. BOWEN, supra note 24, at 117, 123.
54. Maitland, supra note 8, at 4647.
55. Introduction to 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CuSTOMS OF ENGLAND
(BRACTON DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE) 19 (S. Thorne ed. 1968).
56. E. COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENG-
LAND: OR, A COTMMENTARY UPON LiTLErON (3d ed. 1633).
57. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
58. See, e.g., Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436 (1912); see also Frank-
furter, The Early Writings of 0. W. Holmes, Jr., 44 HARv. L. REV. 799 app. II
(1931) (list of opinions delivered as an Associate Justice and Chief Justice of




common law. Cardozo's elegant prose was proportionate to the
elucidation of developing legal doctrine.59 Brandeis's massively
documented judgments were proportionate to judgments rooted
in social facts. 60 Each judge was a prudent person.
Fortitude, like prudence, is often degraded. It is identified
with mere strength of will, steadily expressed; it is treated the
same as stubbornness. In this degraded form of stubbornness,
it is a vice-perhaps the besetting vice of judges. In Dewey's
terms, stubbornness is the willful foreclosure of the exigency of
logic understood as inquiry. For Dewey, a judgment is
"grounded" only when it is the product of "inquiry. '6 1
That each of our six was stubborn on occasion, I find hard
to deny. Stubbornness, as I have just said, is the constant temp-
tation of a judge. The office requires resolve, determination,
firmness; the impatient ending of inquiry is easy. True fortitude
is patient, indeed expressed as patience, as Dewey suggests in
his essay on Holmes.6 2 True fortitude is courageous, indeed ex-
pressed as courage in adversity. True fortitude is the mean be-
tween stubbornness and vacillation. Each of our six showed
true fortitude.
Cardozo grew up in the shadow of a great family disgrace.
His father, Albert Cardozo, was a Supreme Court judge in New
York and a sachem of Tammany when Tammany was ruled by
Boss Tweed. Scorned by virtuous members of the bar, the se-
nior Cardozo finally resigned when the New York legislature
began to investigate his conduct. Never convicted, he was gen-
erally believed to have been guilty of corruption. An old and
proud family name became a by-word. Benjamin N. Cardozo's
whole judicial career may be read as a struggle to establish the
opposite reputation; to show, in his own actions as a judge, jus-
tice in the most unalloyed, incorruptible form.63 Patience in
adversity-fortitude-was Cardozo's conspicuous virtue as he
successfully undertook this mission.
Louis Brandeis practiced law in a Boston notably unsympa-
59. See, e.g., Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921)
(negligence, personal injury case).
60. See, e.g., St. Joseph Stockyards v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 73 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
61. See J. DEWEY, LOGIc: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY 122 (1938). Judgment
for Dewey is "the settled outcome of inquiry." I&c at 120. Strikingly, as a cen-
tral illustration of his logic, Dewey put the judgment of a case by a court. Id
at 120-21.
62. See J. DEWEY, supra note 1, at 179.
63. J. NOONAN, supra note 6, at 143-44.
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thetic, both professionally and socially, to the son of Jewish im-
migrants. Brandeis bore this anti-Semitism with fortitude.64 "I
suppose eighteen centuries of Jewish persecution must have en-
ured me to such hardships," he wrote his brother in 1916 as op-
position intensified to his nomination to the Supreme Court,
"and developed the like of a duck's back. '65 Intensely active in
political reform, he bore with fortitude the attacks his political
zeal provoked.
Fortitude is the virtue Brandeis praised in his defense of
Louis Glavis before the Senate investigating committee: The
government, he said, wants employees who "add to the virtue
of obedience some other virtues-the virtues of manliness, of
truth, of courage, of willingness to risk positions, of the willing-
ness to risk criticisms, of the willingness to risk the misunder-
standings that so often come when people do the heroic
thing."66 As a judge, that same courageous indifference to the
pressures of judicial collegiality marked him as a principled dis-
senter. Fortitude animated a dissent such as his in Casey v.
United States,67 where Holmes wrote the majority opinion6 8
and Brandeis wrote that "to protect the Government" a court
should not accept evidence obtained by entrapment.69
Holmes, whose fortitude was proved in his youth by the
three wounds he suffered as a soldier,70 also exhibited the vir-
tue most markedly in dissent. Not for him easy acceptance of
the views of his class, his party, or his colleagues. Willing to see
the temporary triumph of views he personally thought perni-
cious or puerile, he could, unlike less patient judges, refrain
from injecting his personal preferences into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment and so was capable of
enunciating that modern bill of rights for the people against op-
pressions by a federal court:
I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is per-
verted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant
opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily
would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental
principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our peo-
ple and our law.71
64. A. GAL, BRANDEIS OF BOSTON 31, 41, 115 (1980).
65. Id. at 115.
66. A.T. MASON, supra note 15, at 281.
67. 276 U.S. 413 (1928).
68. See i&i at 416.
69. I. at 425 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
70. M. HowE, supra note 14, at 103, 125, 154.
71. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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The same quality of firm acceptance of a place within our
political system for the expression of views that he found
wrong animated the Abrams dissent, which Brandeis joined. In
Holmes's words, "truth is the only ground" upon which human
wishes "safely can be carried out."72 No one has put the matter
better, or with greater fortitude.
John Marshall, like Holmes, developed fortitude in war as
a young officer and, like Brandeis, established it in political
campaigns in the face of savage political attacks.73 His thirty-
four years as chief justice must by length of service alone be
counted an exercise in fortitude. The single moment when he
most needed the virtue came when he wrote the most impor-
tant of all Supreme Court decisions. Marshall wrote at a time
when a political enemy, who considered him a crafty schemer,
held office as President, and when that President's administra-
tion had already begun to tame the judiciary by repealing the
Judiciary Act of 1801 and reducing the sitting of the Supreme
Court to a single session, postponed for fourteen months from
the date of the act.74 In the teeth of this threat to the indepen-
dence of the Court, Marshall wrote Marbury v. Madison,75 cre-
ated the institution of judicial review, and asserted the
supremacy of the Supreme Court.
Marshall risked political reprisals, even impeachment, with
fortitude. Coke risked his liberty and perhaps his life in assert-
ing the independence of the judiciary against James I. Accounts
of the scene do vary, it must be admitted, not all of them flat-
tering to the fortitude of Coke. I accept his own version. Coke
told James to his face, "[Tihe King in his own person cannot
adjudge any case .... ,7 6
Finally we reach the roots, where judicial independence
was first asserted, and where the greatest fortitude was essen-
tial to its assertion. In the day of Ralegh and Henry III, one's
head was the price to be paid for what the king might see as
contumacious conduct. In words, as a major point in The Laws
and Customs of England, Ralegh maintained the supremacy of
law over royal whim. [S]ub deo et sub lege-"under God and
72. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
73. 1 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 12, at 77-115; 2 id at 379-80.
74. See 1 id at 3, 50, 75, 92, 97.
75. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).




the law"--was his formulation.7 7 Or again, no rex without lex-
no ruler without rules.78 The monarch was constituted by a
legal system; he could not transcend it. When one thinks of the
enormous struggles that have attended acceptance of this prin-
ciple, not only in the developing nations of Africa, the Near
East, Latin America, and Asia, but also in more sophisticated
European countries such as twentieth-century Germany, one is
led to praise above all Ralegh's forceful insistence on this truth,
that the ruler is subject to the law.
In his great treatise, Ralegh did not devise a writ for mak-
ing this subjection of the king judicially controllable. He urged
example-the submission of Jesus and of Mary to the law.79 He
pointed to divine punishment of all evil kings.8 0 He pointed to
a political sanction for royal lawlessness-foreign invasion.8 '
He even devised a political "bridle," as he put it, on a monarch's
will. The king, he wrote, was not alone; he had partners-his
council; and "he who has a partner has a master. '8 2
In his actual practice, Ralegh went one step further. In
1234, sitting as chief justice (the only legal professional), joined
with Edmund, Archbishop of Canterbury, and other bishops
and earls of the realm, he sat on the case of a former chief jus-
tice, Hubert de Burgh, who had revolted against the king and
had been declared an outlaw by the king. Peace had now been
made between Hubert and the king. There was no great risk to
Ralegh in according the reconciled Hubert legal rights. None-
theless, there was a real question as to how these rights should
be accorded. Could a royal act of outlawry be declared a nullity
for lack of due process to the outlaw? So it was thought by
Ralegh. "And it was judged," so the report reads laconically,
"that the outlawry was null. '8 3
A judgment such as this expressed fortitude. Here, as nor-
mally in a judge's life, courage was the crowning virtue.
77. 2 BRAcTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (BRACTON DE




81. Id. at 110.
82. Id.
83. 2 BRACTON's NOTE BOOK, supra note 8, at 667 (Case 857). The chroni-
cler, Matthew Paris, explicitly states that Ralegh pronounced the judgment.
Id at 667 n.1.
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